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AN ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATORY CONTROL OF FARM MANAGEMENT 
PREVIEW 
This paper considers: 
1. The failure of regulatory management in the farming sector 
looking specifically at: 
Irrigation schemes 
Pest Control 
1948 Land Act 
Water rights administration. 
2. Whether the Resource Management Act is regulatory or 
non-regulatory. 
3. How to achieve non-regulatory farm management under the 
Resource Management Act. 
4. Some brief observations of mine as to whether Regional 
Councils or unitary authorities are the preferred authority 
to carry out the rural resource management functions under 
the Resource Management Act. 
5. The economic implications of regulatory control in farm 
management. 
INTRODUCTION 
The reason for regulatory control in our lives is self evident. It 
is to protect the interests, or perceived interests, of the wider 
public from the actions of the individual. Some areas of 
regulatory control are essential and justified, e.g. vehicle 
maintenance standards by way of a warrant of fitness procedure and 
road safety laws policed by the Ministry of Transport. These two 
examples show different levels of control. 
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The vehicle maintenance standards by a warrant of fitness procedure 
demonstrates a regulatory management in the form of setting 
standards however the implementation is carried out under a 
competitive free market enterprise regime. The second example of 
road safety laws policed by the Ministry of Transport demonstrates 
both a regulatory standard and bureaucratic/regulatory 
implementation. 
The concerns in terms of regulatory management, in terms of 
critical thinking, are whether: 
1. Regulatory control should be imposed in the first place or 
could protection be achieved in another way; 
2. If regulatory control is required to what extent is it 
required; and 
3. If regulatory control is required should the implementation 
be carried out by a regulatory/bureaucratic authority or can 
it be left to the market system? 
My intention is to point out later in this paper how regulatory 
management is prone to failure consequently the questions listed 
above are important. 
It is accepted that the critical analysis of the requirements for 
regulatory control are affected by social attitudes at the time 
which can then become outmoded. The licensing changes of the liquor 
industry in terms of hours of trade are a good example of this with 
the historic 6.00pm closing being now seen as an anachronism with 
24 hour trading licences now available. It is unrealistic to 
criticise regulations in hindsight while ignoring the social 
demands which applied at the time. This example does however 
demonstrate the fickle nature of social attitudes and demonstrates 
a caution in passing regulations to protect social attitudes which 
may have a short life span in terms of their fashionability. 
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This paper is not so concerned with the temporary nature of social 
attitudes and their impact on the passing of regulations but rather 
is mQre concerned with the critical analysis of alternatives to the 
passing of regulations and the alternative to implementation by 
regulatory authorities in the commercial environment, more 
particularly being the farming environment. 
The de-regulation of the provision of health services, the energy 
sector reform, and de-licensing of the liquor industry and motor 
spirits industry are a small number of the examples of the 
de-regulating commercial environment in reflecting the current 
thinking that the regulatory management of commercial activities is 
not the most effective or efficient form of management. However 
the rural sector appears to still suffer from a large amount of 
regulatory control. 
I don't corne from a pure school of market economics seeking to 
leave all controls to the market place. however I am concerned at 
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the failures in the past of regulatory control in the rural sector 
and the implications of the all encompassing Resource Management 
Act in terms of rural management. 
THE FAILURE OF REGULATORY MANAGEMENT IN THE FARMING SECTOR 
I want to discuss briefly four examples of regulatory control and 
management in the rural sector which in my mind demonstrates the 
failure of the regulatory approach and the alternatives. These 
four examples are: 
Crown administration of irrigation schemes. 
Regional Council management of pest control. 
Crown management of the high country pursuant to the Land 
Act. 
Management regime of water rights. 
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1. IRRIGATION SCHEMES 
Prior to 1989 the community irrigation schemes in New Zealand 
were owned by the Crown and constructed and managed firstly 
by the Ministry of Works & Development and latterly by the 
Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries employing Works. [I 
refer to 1989 as although the Irrigation Schemes Act 
privatising irrigation schemes was not passed until 1990, 
during the 1989/90 irrigation season a number of irrigation 
schemes were managed under licence to the Crown pursuant to 
the sales program.] 
Considering only the Central Otago irrigation schemes, being 
the area in which I work, the historic data is quite telling. 
Summary of Central Otago Irrigation Scheme Costs 
(Standardised to September 1988 Dollars) 
24,874 
Capital Costs 
($(Ha) 
4,712 
Cost of Operations 
($(Ha) 
92 
Accumulated 
Losses ($(Ha) 
995 
Attached as Appendix A is a table detailing the general 
scheme data for the Central Otago irrigation schemes. 
The following additional points should be noted: 
(a) The Central Otago schemes (which are the oldest schemes 
in the country) have the greatest district losses in the 
country. These losses result from under-recovery of 
operating expenditure with revenue being half the 
operating costs while interest charges are minimal. 
Growth of historic losses has been outstripped by 
inflation leading to a decrease in real terms. 
(b) The losses of the Central Otago schemes take into 
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account very little expenditure on renewals. Given the 
age of the schemes, expensive renewals are likely in the 
near future. 
(c) The country's total accumulated loss at the end of 
1987/88 amounted to $58 million dollars. 
(d) The Crown/MAF administration charges are not included in 
the assessment of loss. This cost would be 
considerable. 
As mentioned above, it should also be noted that there was 
very little, if any, significant renewals or money being set 
aside for renewals. Given the age of the Central Otago 
schemes, renewal expenditure is inevitable. 
Given the high cost of scheme operation, even under the 
Government subsidised arrangement, the position had, before 
privatisation, become critical for such schemes as Arrow and 
Teviot. Almost all Central Otago schemes faced unsustainable 
charges if the Crown regulatory body changed over to a full 
user pay costing regime. 
You may have noticed that the Bannockburn Scheme is the one 
exceptional performer of the old Central Otago schemes. This 
is certainly not because it is an easy scheme to operate. 
This scheme was inherited from the old mining structures in 
the area. It operates at a very high altitude bringing water 
over ancient fluming, around steep faces and through rock 
tunnels. You will note that there is a nominal accumulated 
loss. On Appendix B attached you will see that the mean 
standardised cost of operations was $18.80/ha. The 
irrigation company now operating the Bannockburn Scheme under 
private ownership is currently charging $25.00 per hectare 
which includes provision for significant reconstruction and 
renewals currently being carried out. 
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The difference between the Bannockburn Scheme operation and 
the other C~ntral Otago schemes was that the Bannockburn 
Scheme had been run by a Board made up of the users, whereas 
the other fchemes were run by the Crown. 
One further interesting example to note demonstrating the 
advantages achieved through private ownership is a study of 
the completion of the Maniototo Irrigation Scheme. The 
Government estimates to complete that scheme were in the 
order of $15 million dollars. Under private ownership, the 
irrigation company actual costs of completion were $1.3 
million dollars, i.e. less than the GST content of the 
Government's estimated costs. The privately completed scheme 
produced the same water to the same locations as the proposed 
Crown scheme. One of the factors which enabled the 
irrigation company to achieve major savings was reducing the 
standard from that of a 100 year quality to a quality in life 
span which more properly reflected the planning period for 
irrigation demand and which was more suitable to the 
operational circumstances of that scheme. 
The reason for the regulatory management of community 
irrigation schemes was that at the start of the century the 
Government through its Public Works Department was heavily 
involved in the development and growth of national works 
including roading and rail and including, for Central Otago, 
the very important irrigation development. Part of this 
process of irrigation development was the taking over of 
mining rights, aggregating them and making them available 
back to the community as community irrigation schemes. There 
was also a number of capital irrigation works by the 
Government during the depression years. It can therefore be 
seen that the original Central Otago irrigation schemes' 
development, ownership and operation was a consequence of the 
social and political climate at the time and was associated 
with rural land subdivision, allocation and development. 
History has unfortunately demonstrated that the retained 
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ownership and operation of the irrigation schemes by the 
Crown was to the detriment of the public and farmers in terms 
of expenditure, inefficiencies and losses. 
The Government has now privatised the irrigation schemes 
transferring ownership to the irrigators who have formed 
co-operative irrigation companies to own and operate the 
schemes. The result is that the farmers are managing the 
water as a co-operative retailer providing: 
Maximum efficiency 
Lower cost to the irrigators 
Provision of funds for future renewals 
Lower operating costs 
No ongoing Government subsidy and no ongoing Government 
administration costs 
Better resolution of conflict between irrigators and 
management. 
It is conceded that the terms of settlement of the 
privatisation process were sufficiently favourable to give a 
good chance of survival of the schemes however the 
fundamental factor responsible for the recent success has 
been the innovative, energetic, efficient and flexible 
management by the irrigation schemes by the farmers 
themselves. 
The irrigators are not only benefiting from low irrigation 
charges but are also receiving the benefit of innovative 
methods to solve problems such as looking to pipe relining 
rather than replacement, the provision for renewals and an 
ability to resolve disputes. 
The wider irrigator interests are protected by the structure 
of irrigator ownership of the shares in the irrigation 
companies, which are linked to the irrigators water 
entitlement. The company documents have been drawn up to 
protect the irrigators. 
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In summary, the dismantling of the regulatory ownership, 
control and management of the irrigation schemes has resulted 
in greater efficiency, greater innovation, lower costs, 
greater long term security and greater protection to the 
individual irrigators and the wider community. The old 
regulatory management would have resulted in a collapse of 
the systems in a user pay environment. 
2. PEST CONTROL BY REGIONAL COUNCIL 
The Regional Council administration of pest control in 
Central Otago has resulted in the following justified 
complaints: 
High cost in terms of administration and implementation. 
Ineffective implementation. 
Cross subsidy from the efficient farmers carrying out 
secondary control themselves who fund, by way of the 
rating system, inefficient farmers carrying out no 
secondary control. 
Reliance on a single method of control being 1080 
poisoning. 
Applying control techniques after rabbit numbers have 
got out of control. 
The system does not provide the protection of market 
pressures or market options on cost control and 
effective implementation. 
These complaints are an inevitable result of the 
regulatory/bureaucratic centralised management of rabbits. 
Looking at the farmers who have successfully taken on 
themselves the control of the rabbits, there has been a 
reduced reliance on 1080 poisoning, a variety of secondary 
control methods used and rabbit numbers are maintained at a 
much lower level. 
The solution to achieving a much more efficient, cost 
effective and greater rabbit control is to bring the 
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responsibility of control back to the farmer. The farmer 
knows his property best and stands to make the greatest gain 
from his innovative methods and hard work in rabbit control. 
The regulatory system of management is simply counter 
productive. 
Your response might now be "what about the farmers who won't 
control the rabbits resulting in a sustainability problem and 
a spread of rabbits to properties well controlled". My 
response is that we can't do totally away with regulations. 
There needs to be an underlying requirement for the Regional 
Council to police the effective control and implement such 
control, at the cost of the individual farmer concerned, when 
that farmer fails to provide a specified minimum control. 
The critical issue in this case is not the importance of 
requiring control by regulation but rather to remove the 
implementation by regulatory body unless individual farmers 
fail to carry out their responsibilities. It is the 
demarcation point which is important rather than an argument 
for the total elimination of any regulatory control. 
Incidentally, the Regional Council's monopoly on 1080 poison 
application should be terminated. There should be put in 
place a licensing system for applicators and in that way 
market forces would create the best and most cost competitive 
performers in terms of 1080 applicators. 
3. 1948 LAND ACT 
From reading the address of the Honourable Mr C F Skinner 
(Minister of Lands) on moving the second reading of the Land 
Bill, you will note that the reason behind pastoral leases 
was for soil conservation purposes, to prevent erosion, to 
prevent overstocking and to regenerate the land contained in 
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the leases (Hansard Parliamentary Debate on the Land Bill 
[1948] 3993 - 4243). 
After four decades of regulatory control under the Land Act: 
The high country sustainability issues are of more 
concern and the debate more intense. 
There are extensive examples, especially in the McKenzie 
country of unproductive land. 
The Land Act has been attempted to be used by the 
Department of Conservation to protect their perceived 
areas carrying conservation values (the PNAjRAP 
classification) by introducing conservation values to 
the discretionary decision making process under the Land 
Act to an extent whereby conservation values have 
interfered with the good husbandry and exclusive 
pastoral rights of the pastoral lessee and to an extent 
beyond the powers of the Land Act. 
The farmers are concerned about the security of their 
perpetually renewable leases in terms of possible 
statutory amendment. 
Farmers are severely limited in terms of their 
development and use options for the land. 
The Department of Conservation is now concerned that 
(following a successful challenge of their rights of 
influence under the Act) the Act does not give DOC the 
protection powers that DOC required. 
Sectors of the general public want continued Crown 
control of pastoral leases for public access not 
understanding that the farmer has the exclusive right 
under the pastoral lease regime and could stop public 
access (subject to the easement and reserve provisions 
of the Land Act). 
The Land Act is not really dealing effectively with the 
sustainability issues. 
The cost of Crown administration of pastoral leases is 
more than double the rental received. 
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The soil and vegetation protection provisions of the 
Land Act are duplicated, surpassed and rendered obsolete 
by the more comprehensive provisions under the Resource 
Management Act. 
Four decades of regulatory control have passed only to 
demonstrate the failure and expense of the regulatory control 
of pastoral leases. 
The solution is a tenure change incorporating the freeholding 
of pastoral leases and using the Resource Management Act to 
protect the sustainability issues with respect to the 
freehold farm land. Selected areas of high conservation or 
recreational value could be retained in public ownership, 
acquired off the farmers by way of a trade off. (Public 
ownership of such land creates it own particular problems in 
terms of sustainability maintenance and rabbit control which 
I am not detailing in this paper.) 
4. WATER RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 
Under this heading I consider the regulatory approach to 
water rights management and a market alternative. The goal 
of a good water management regime is the appropriate 
allocation of the water resource in an economically and 
socially acceptable fashion, in a manner which meets the 
changing economical and physical environment, in a way which 
achieves the best efficiencies in water use and in a way 
which protects environmental and other in-stream values. 
The regulatory management of water, which appears to be the 
current preference of the Regional Councils, is to totally 
control the water allocation under a water permitting system 
revolving around short term permits to ensure an ability to 
reallocate on expiry to other users either abstractive or 
in-stream should circumstances require it, so as to meet the 
changing economical, social and physical environment and to 
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provide a fair allocation between competing water users. In 
my opinion this system is possible in theory but doomed in 
practice for the following reasons: 
(a) Short term permits and the possibility of a refusal of a 
renewal of the permit on expiry so that it can be 
allocated to a different user (whether that be 
environmental in-stream use or another abstractive user) 
results in total insecurity and consequently threatens 
investment and development, which in turn threatens; 
efficiencies, the investment into new opportunities and 
the best use of water. 
(b) The refusal to reissue permits on expiry or the carrying 
out of major reallocations of permits or priority 
reallocation to different groups at various intervals, 
would result in social and economic upheaval, would be 
socially unacceptable and would clearly result in 
conflict and antagonism on the part of those permit 
holders who have had their water rights/permits 
compulsorily removed or benefits eroded by priority 
changes or by introducing more abstractive users to the 
system thereby eroding the rights of prior water users. 
(c) Applications to regulatory authorities encourage over 
exaggeration of submissions in an effort to succeed with 
the applications and also encourage over applications 
for water requirements to build in a buffer against a 
cut-back situation. 
(d) The system is based on advocacy, competition and 
conflict, which polarises the parties and which is 
counter productive when trying to achieve compatible 
sharing and lateral resolutions to water shortage 
problems. 
(e) The system is inflexible and is not immediately 
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responsive to changes in the markets and environmental 
and human demands. 
(f) The human failure element is ever present. 
(g) The system requires full participation of all existing 
and potential users, however, the contradiction is that 
the expense, awareness and time commitments involved in 
such a process, narrows the field of the participants. 
This results in decision making without full knowledge 
or full participation. 
(h) The system is expensive for all participants, both in 
terms of time and money. 
(i) The system carries with it the risk of expensive and 
resource wasting appeals. 
(j) The results are uncertain. 
(k) There is no easily accessible method for weighing up the 
opportunity cost of alternative users. 
(1) There is no market created opportunity cost with respect 
to water which therefore denies an incentive for water 
use efficiency. 
(m) Such a system is usually non-priority based which 
permits new entrants and the over-allocation, during 
times of shortage, of the water resource. This forces a 
pro-rata reduction of available water on existing users 
and increases the unreliability and insecurity of the 
water supply. 
I suggest that the much preferred alternative to this 
regulatory management of water is an arrangement which 
provides for a secure water right necessary for capital 
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investment and production both on-farm and off-farm . The two 
essential ingredients of security of water rights are; 
security of tenure and security of priority. Security of 
tenure is a long term water permit. Security of priority is 
an arrangement whereby existing permit holders are 
unaffected, in terms of their water availability, by new 
permits subsequently issued. Such a system, linked with the 
market mechanisms for easy transferability of water permits 
rather than the regulatory reallocation approach provides the 
following benefits: 
(i) Confidence and protection for capital works and the 
high cost of maintaining and refurbishing high cost 
structures including irrigation works to improve the 
more efficient use of water and water augmentation 
during water short periods. 
(ii) The long term of security of rights can be maintained 
yet there is immediate availability of a responsive 
method for transferring permits whenever circumstances 
require and can support a change. You therefore have 
long term security for protection and encouragement of 
investment, yet still have available a method of short 
term responsiveness and flexibility of transfers. 
(iii) The movement of water permits is voluntary rather than 
imposed. 
(iv) The system encourages communication and negotiation 
between the parties to bring about a shared and 
mUltiple use of the resource. 
(v) Tradability works at a level that people are familiar 
with and can readily participate in. 
(vi) The participation expenses are minimised and hearing 
expenses are avoided. 
(vii) 
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It identifies the opportunity cost of the inefficient 
use of water and under utilised water rights. 
(viii) It identifies the relative value of water to competing 
users so that the true cost of transfers is apparent. 
Incidentally such a system provides better benefit for 
in-stream values and users in that the system promotes 
greater efficiencies and provides a secure framework in which 
to establish and maintain water storage structures and other 
off-farm capital works. 
I recognise that some regulatory control under the Resource 
Management Act is required to provide for minimum in-stream 
flows to protect the "ecological bottom line" and that on 
particular rivers, a greater level of minimum in-stream flow, 
above the ecological bottom line, is desirable for 
environmental/recreational purposes. Such minimum in-stream 
flows for environmental/recreational purposes require the 
same protection of security of tenure and priority and would 
benefit from the transferability regime just as the 
abstractive users. 
This analysis of water management options highlights the 
desirability of providing an alternative secure tradable 
mechanism and market tradability to the regulatory approach 
of allocation. 
A good working example of competing water users resolving 
their differences and reaching a sound agreement to the 
benefit of both parties, is the agreement between the Teviot 
Irrigation Company Limited and the Otago Central Electric 
Power Board with respect to their shared use of the water 
resource on the Teviot River (in Central Otago). The 
consequences of the shared arrangement and the previous 
agreement between the Crown and the Otago Central Electric 
Power Board, is that the high cost capital works undertaken 
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by the Power Board benefits the irrigation scheme as the 
historic water user and water right holder. The parties 
share the common works and have reached agreement between 
themselves as to the abstraction of water to give best effect 
to both users. Throughout this arrangement, the secure water 
right (which was a secure mining privilege) was preserved and 
made available to both users. This was much preferred to a 
system of reallocation of the right or the overissuing of the 
available water, by a regulatory authority, which would have 
merely bought the parties into conflict and would not have 
achieved the common sharing and efficiencies which in fact 
resulted. 
I suggest that a similar symbiotic arrangement resulting in 
substantial capital investment in water storage and use, the 
sharing of the capital works, the sharing of the water right 
on terms acceptable to both parties and the retention of a 
secure water right, would not have been achieved under a 
regulatory allocation system. 
These four examples of high cost in damaging regulatory management 
relating to farm land and water fail because they lack the key 
ingredients of; accountability, incentives, efficiency, motivation, 
flexibility and security. These factors are best achieved by self 
management and implementation. If some regulatory control is 
required to protect the wider public good, this should be provided 
judiciously and should without doubt not extend into 
implementation. 
In summary therefore: 
The irrigation scheme example is one where the Crown should 
have no role whatsoever in irrigation scheme management. 
The pest control example demonstrates a regulatory role for 
the Regional Councils in terms of setting standards and 
policing but not in implementation. 
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The Land Act model demonstrates at the worst the failure, and 
at the best the obsolescence, of a particular regulatory 
approach. 
The water management regime model demonstrates the danger of 
regulatory management becoming too extensive and resulting in 
a damaging or potentially damaging regime which does not 
achieve the most desirable outcome. 
If a regulatory system is to apply in relation to the rural sector 
it is essential that the regulatory authority (who sets the 
regulatory requirements and standards) and the farmers (who must 
implement the regulatory standards) are able to work in 
co-operative partnership, with the demarcation points between the 
parties defined at a point which promotes maximum success and 
efficiencies and is most cost effective. 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACT - REGULATORY OR NON-REGULATORY 
The Resource Management Act has enormous potential to influence, 
control or manage our use of the land and water. 
The fundamental purpose of the Act is to promote the sustainable 
management of our natural and physical resources. However the 
purposes and principles extend to sustainability, protection of the 
environment and protection of conservation values. This Act has 
the potential to touch everything we do. It is a very important 
piece of legislation both in terms of land, water and air use and 
in terms of our future generations use and enjoyment of these 
resources. 
Although the Act is clearly regulatory in the sense that it 
requires regional and territorial authorities to administer the 
functions under the Act, in my mind the Act doesn't predetermine a 
regulatory approach. I concede that on the face of it, you can't 
carry out a land or water use without the presence of resource 
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consents, hearings, tribunal appeals and land management officers. 
That is the ultimate in regulatory management. On the other hand 
these methods are not necessarily the consequence of resource 
management under the Act. The Act provides for uses under policy 
statements and management plans as permitted uses which is a 
process avoiding the resource consent requirements. 
It is worthwhile at this point to refer to the speech by the 
Minister for the Environment when moving the third reading of the 
Resource Management Bill which explains the legislative intent in 
relation to controlling activities. I have annexed as Appendix C 
the extract from Hansard (1991) page 3016. I have copied out this 
extract in full as it does provide some enlightenment as to the 
legislative intent. From reading this extract you will note that 
the Government has moved from planning activities to regulating 
only the effects. The intention is clearly to provide 
environmental bottom lines but to legitimise intervention only to 
such degree as is required to achieve the purposes of the Act. The 
outcome should be that the use and development of resources will 
only be restricted to the extent required to protect against 
adverse environmental effects. 
It is also relevant to refer to section 32 of the Act which 
requires that any authority administering the Act must consider 
whether: 
(a) Their proposed methods are necessary to achieve the purposes 
of the Act; and 
(b) Whether there are other means to achieve the purposes 
including provision of information, services, incentives or 
levying of charges; and 
(c) The reasons for and against adopting the proposed methods 
considering alternatives or the option of no action. 
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In relation to the above, the authority must: 
Carry out an evaluation of the likely benefits and costs of 
the alternative means including an assessment of how likely 
the method will be in achieving the objective and including 
implementation and compliance costs. 
Be satisfied that the method is necessary in achieving the 
purposes of the Act and is the most appropriate means of 
exercising the function having regard to its efficiency and 
effectiveness in relation to other means. 
In other words, the authority must choose the best methods having 
regard to; achieving the purposes under the Act, efficiency, 
effectiveness, and implementation and compliance costs. It is this 
section 32, more than any other section in the Act, which provides 
protection against ineffective and high cost regulatory management 
and implementation. 
What I am saying is that the Act doesn't predetermine a regulatory 
approach. Rather, it is the methods used by the administrative 
authorities in giving effect to the Act which is critical. 
Considering that Regional Councils are at the moment determining 
their methods, policy statements and regional plans to deal with 
the sustainability issues, now is the critical time for land users 
to influence the methods and controls for administering resources. 
My next section therefore has been included in this paper to 
provide some suggestions on how the farming community can assist in 
avoiding a regulatory management of their farming activities. 
HOW TO ACHIEVE NON-REGULATORY FARM MANAGEMENT UNDER THE RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT ACT 
I have written this section of my paper as a sequential plan rather 
than as a narrative. 
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1. Action, to be most effective, needs to be taken before the 
Local Authority has prepared its draft policies. The key is 
to influence both councillor and staff thinking before they 
irreversibly determine their own views on the issues. This 
means that the time for action is RIGHT NOW. 
2. Understand the reasons for minimising regulatory control in 
terms of environmental effects and certainly in avoiding any 
regulatory involvement in implementation, i.e. understand and 
identify the threat posed by the Resource Management Act and 
its interpretation and implementation by Regional Councils. 
The examples given by me relating to pest control and water 
allocation management earlier in this paper demonstrate the 
failure of regulatory control. In addition to these 
examples, I make the following further comments: 
(a) The Resource Management Act requires Regional Councils 
(which reference to Regional Councils is also a 
reference to any unitary authorities which take over 
their role) to administer the rural resources so that 
they are used on a sustainable basis with any adverse 
environmental effect to be minimised or avoided. 
(b) Traditionally statutory authorities have carried out 
their administrative functions by regulation, field 
officers management, and notified application 
procedures. 
It is suggested that, with respect to resource 
management, if a Regional Council chose to carry out its 
administrative functions in this way: 
It would not be effective; 
It would be time consuming for all concerned; 
Farmers' independent decision making would be 
regulated and managed by policy and officials; 
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There would be limited participation by farmers in 
service delivery which could be carried out in an 
inefficient and expensive manner; 
The farmers would be paying for the administration, 
service delivery and monitoring as the resource 
users. 
Such a system could not easily reflect climatic and 
physical differences or different management 
practices. 
(c) As the farmers will be paying for the resource 
management and control and as their farming businesses 
will be affected by the methods chosen to achieve the 
purposes of the Resource Management Act, and because the 
farmers best know their land and visually monitor it 
daily, the farmers are best to design and implement 
sustainable management methods on-farm. In fact, those 
same decisions on sustainability and environmental 
effect are also important from a farmers own on-farm 
management plan situation. 
To put it briefly, the farmers own the problem, they 
will have to pay for the resolution and therefore they 
must be most active in creating and managing the 
solutions in terms of implementation. 
(d) The Regional Council threat is therefore its 
implementation of the Resource Management Act, i.e. a 
concern of high cost and inflexible regulatory control. 
3. Identify the action to be taken by the farmers to bring about 
an outcome satisfactory to the farmers. I suggest the 
process should be: 
Establish in the minds of the decision makers and 
interest groups the credibility/professionalism of the 
farming community. 
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Form professional groups of common interest. 
Balance the message in the minds of the public. 
Establish in the minds of decision makers the farmers' 
perspective. 
Influence the Regional Council policies and decisions. 
These processes can be divided up into a key catalyst and the 
support items and the sustaining items. 
The catalyst (i.e. the single direction which would start 
giving effect to resolving the threat) is: 
The forming of groups. 
The support items are: 
Establish in the minds of decision makers and interest 
groups the farmers credibility and professionalism. 
Establish in the minds of decision makers the farmers' 
perspective, on site. 
Sustaining the direction would come by: 
Educating the public. 
4. (a) I have recorded that the key to establishing farmer 
credibility, educating a Regional Council and the public 
and influencing a Regional Council is the effective use 
of land management groups. This process is broken down 
into two parts: 
(i) The formation of groups which I discuss under 
Part 5 which follows; and 
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(ii) The more general matters in terms of the strategy 
and effectiveness of the groups which I discuss 
under Part 6 which follows. This part deals with 
such things as the importance of standards of 
conduct, full farmer support of the group and a 
strategy for dealing with a Regional Council. 
(b) The purpose of the group is: 
To firstly increase the group's own area of 
influence, control and independent decision making 
in terms of on-farm sustainability implementation 
and to decrease that of the Regional Council; and 
Secondly to increase the Regional Council's 
contribution in terms of sensible and workable 
policy establishment, research, education and 
facilitation. 
(c) The basic principles which need to be impressed on the 
Regional Council could be along the following lines: 
The farmers are best to design and implement 
sustainable management methods on farm. As the 
farmers are paying for the resolution of their own 
problems, they must be most active in creating and 
managing the solutions. 
Co-operative land management groups and peer 
pressure is the best way to achieve farmer support. 
Successful sustainable land management in the 
farming situation requires full farmer support. 
The Regional Council should encourage co-operative 
land management and farmer initiative to implement 
sustainable management. 
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The Regional Council should use its resources to 
support co-operative land management and support 
sustainable land management by promoting research, 
studies and education. 
(d) It is important to keep the issues and points simple 
when presenting a proposal to the farmers to establish 
the land management groups and also to the Regional 
Council when pursuing the influencing of its policy. 
(e) The greatest influence would be obtained by a unified 
and co-ordinated approach by representatives of all the 
land management groups of a particular district. This 
entails a co-ordination of the representatives of all 
the groups in a particular district and a good level of 
communication between those groups. 
5. The process of implementing the groups is: 
(a) Define the aims, objectives and goals for the group. 
This gives the group its meaning and provides a reason 
and motivation to initiate the group and for the members 
to attend. 
(b) Establish tentative initial boundaries for the purposes 
of initial communication with proposed members. I feel 
that once the group is up and running the ultimate 
boundaries will naturally form themselves. 
The initial boundaries could be geographic or could be a 
mixture of geographic definition and the involvement of 
existing groups. 
Once the initial tentative boundaries of the group is 
defined, the prospective members can be targeted and 
informed as to the purpose, aims, objectives and goals 
of the group. 
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(c) Achieve community support. Full support is needed if 
the group wishes to establish its credibility and 
influence with the Regional Council, i.e. the group 
needs to be able to say that it represents almost all 
of the farmers in that particular area. 
(d) Redefine the groups aims, objectives and goals as an 
ongoing process. 
In following the above framework I suggest that the following 
should be considered: 
(i) The areas "movers and shakers" are needed to get the 
process started. These drivers provide the energy to 
establish the group. There must be at least two 
working together. They would communicate firstly with 
those people who they considered would be enthusiastic 
followers of the concept and together work on 
establishing the group. 
(ii) Inform the community of the reasons for the group: 
By holding a community meeting. 
Call this meeting by letter detailing the 
background, need, aims, etc. 
Phone around after the letter. 
(iii) Reasons for the group include: 
What the Regional Council under the Resource 
Management Act and other outsiders could do, i.e. 
identify the threat. 
If the individuals want self implementation it 
appears that this would most likely be supported by 
the Regional Councils if groups are established . 
Co-operative management shares information and 
reduces the individual costs. It may also assist 
with more effective on-farm implementation and once 
the groups are formed and if the representatives of 
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the different groups combine together with a view 
to presenting a unified policy approach to the 
Regional Council, the groups would be much more 
effective in influencing future policy than any 
individuals. 
(iv) Activate the community in support of the group. 
(v) Include local conservationists (which phrase is 
intended to include environmentalists). The logic 
behind this is that with the local conservationists' 
support the more militant full time paid advocates of 
the conservation groups may become less polarised (i.e. 
opposed), may have less influence and will certainly be 
better informed. It would be more effective to educate 
and make more aware the "rank and file" of the 
conservation groups by involving them in the land 
management groups and giving them a voice, rather than 
the only communication coming from opposite positions 
when advocating a farm management practice in front of 
a Regional Councilor Tribunal. 
(vi) Approach existing community organisations. 
Interrelated with this is the concept of your 
co-operative land management group providing an 
umbrella structure for subgroups. 
6. The key to establishing credibility of the farmers is the 
establishment of the groups. This establishment has already 
been detailed by me under the preceding part number 5. 
As well as establishing the groups, the credibility of the 
groups and their influence needs to be determined. The 
credibility of the groups and the success of the groups: 
(a) Requires a high standard of conduct of its members. 
This will require some monitoring of members and 
application of peer pressure. 
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(b) Requires that the group reflects the farming community 
views, i.e. most of the farmers in the particular area, 
and must convince the Regional Council that the group 
does represent this group of farmers. 
(c) Requires a strategy of influence: 
Present a united case to the Regional Council. 
United both in terms of full support from the 
group's own members and united in terms of a 
combined and co-ordinated approach from all the 
group representatives to the Regional Council. 
The process should then be to: 
(i) Express basic simple principles to the Regional 
Council: 
What is necessary to gain and maintain farmer 
support. 
What will be the consequences of a failure to gain 
and maintain farmer support. 
(ii) Present a professional case to the Regional Council. 
(iii) Invite Regional Council representatives to visit on 
site for a presentation of the farmers' perspective. 
(iv) Seek a commitment from the Regional Council that it 
takes the groups and issues seriously. 
REGIONAL COUNCIL v UNITARY AUTHORITY 
Currently in Otago and no doubt in other centres in New Zealand 
there is some different opinions as to the establishment of unitary 
authorities in the place of Regional Councils. My opinion on this 
issue is that the following fundamental matters are of importance 
in determining the right authority: 
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The resources available for technical research monitoring, 
education and facilitation. Regional Councils, with their 
large urban populations, would have greater resources 
available. 
Availability of quality personnel. Again Regional Councils 
with their larger rating base should be able to have 
available a higher quality of personnel. 
Which authority will provide the most innovative, 
non-regulatory policies. This could be either type of 
authority. Naturally, the threat of a unitary authority 
should be the ultimate persuasive influence in bringing about 
a sensible management approach from a Regional Council. 
If unitary authorities were to prevail there could be some 
savings in administration and councillors costs, however 
there would be substantial duplication in policy and plan 
developments, research, monitoring etc, between unitary 
authorities, unless there was a significant degree of 
communication, technology transfer and information transfer 
between unitary authorities in a region. If unitary 
authorities were to prevail, I believe that the advantages 
which could be achieved by the Regional Council in terms of 
greater resources and lack of duplication, would need to be 
achieved by unitary authorities by interaction and 
communication between the unitary authorities. 
ECONOMIC ISSUE 
At the end of the day, this total paper is about the higher costs 
posed by regulatory control in relation to farm management . These 
costs are incurred through direct payments for such things as 
resource consent fees, lawyers and payment of rates and services 
and also comprise of indirect costs such as demanding more time 
input from the farmers, a loss in efficiency and a loss in 
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production. This adds up to a loss of a competitive sale price. 
These losses can all be considered as transaction costs resulting 
from the regulatory system. 
The higher the transaction costs the greater a wedge is driven 
between the crossing point where demand equals supply. 
I have attached as Appendix D an extract from Mansfield E; 
Micro-Economics Theory and Applications, 227. This copy extract 
demonstrates the effect of transaction costs on reducing the 
quantity of goods able to be sold. The ominous message is that if 
the transaction costs are high enough there may no longer be any 
profit to be made out of those goods. 
The issue of costs in production and transaction costs is of major 
importance to the farmer. Accordingly this issue of regulatory 
management is an important management issue and I believe is one 
which can be influenced by effective farmers. 
SUMMARY 
In this paper I have sought to: 
Demonstrate examples of the failure and expense of regulatory 
management in the farming sector and have shown preferred 
alternatives. 
I have concluded that the Resource Management Act is not by 
necessity an unduly regulatory and onerous piece of 
legislation. Rather, it is the chosen method of 
implementation by Regional Councils or unitary authorities 
which is of fundamental importance. 
I have demonstrated a model, in terms of the land management 
groups, to influence the bringing about of a non-regulatory 
farm management under the Resource Management Act and have 
suggested how to go about setting up such groups. 
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I have briefly provided some comments on the issues between 
Regional Councils and unitary authorities in terms of the 
preferred authority, from the farmers' perspective, in 
carrying out the Resource Management Act. 
I have concluded by drawing attention to the on-farm impact 
of over-regulatory management in terms of a farmer's ability 
to trade profitably. 
Generally, I have sought to establish that over-regulatory control 
of farm management is not desirable, is avoidable and can be 
influenced by effective farmers, who at times will need to seek 
professional assistance in achieving the most desirable outcome. 
Alexandra 
14th November 1992 
- 31 -
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS/REFERENCES 
1. The financial data relating to the Crown operation of the 
Central Otago irrigation schemes detailed under my section 
"The Failure of Regulatory Management in the Farming Sector -
Irrigation Schemes" is taken from "New Zealand Community 
Irrigation Schemes Historical Accounts up to the Completion 
of the 1987/88 Irrigation Season" Volume One Report on 
Irrigation Financing December 1989 by B R White & P L 
Blackwood and prepared for MAF Technology. 
2. Don Bagnall, the Irrigation Adviser to MAF Policy Wellington 
assisted me with some background information on the reasons 
for the original Crown ownership of the old Central Otago 
Irrigation Schemes. However naturally, I take responsibility 
for the comments expressed on this matter. 
3. The copy extract from Hansard [1991] with respect to the 
Resource Management Act is copied from the Brooker & Friend 
Ltd Resource Management Act publication Volume 1 paragraph A 
5.07. 
4. The plan, procedures in forming groups and matters relating 
to the credibility of groups is from work I was involved with 
in the bringing together of representatives of land 
management groups in Central Otago, reflects the consensus of 
the Central Otago groups and is a process being following by 
those groups. 
AJSS-395 
TABLE A 3.1 General Scheme Data 
Scheme Name Irrigable Water No of Legislation Approved First Supply End of Form of Notified Accumulated Operator Irrigator 
Area Availa- Irrigators Develop- Capital Interest Loss End of Organisation 
(ha) bility ment Liability Rate ("10) 87/88 
Area Period ($OOOs) 
(hal 
Central Otago 
Ardgour/8eggs 527 527 12 PW Act 10 1923/34 1923 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 598 Works Formal com-
Charges S199 capital I'niltee with 
of PW Act 81 Tarras 
Arrow 930 930 50 PW Act 10 1926 1930 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 1927. Works Formal 
Charges 5199 capital committee 
of PW Act 81 
Bannockburn 321 321 26 PW Act 10/28 Agree- 1922 n.a. Int on 1/3 4 Irrigators Elected board 
ment 1957 capital 
Earnscleughl 1159 1159 88 PW Act 10/28 1924 1922 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 988 Works Formal 
Blackmans Charges 5199 capital committee 
of PW Act 81 
Galloway 1064 1064 28 PW Act 10 1924 1920 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 combined Works Incorporated 
Charges 5199 capital with Ida Valley society 
of PW Act 81 
Hawkdun 3308 3308 60 PWAct 1926 1929 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 3651 Works Formal 
10 & 28 capital committee 
Charges S 199 with Idaburn 
of PW Act 81 
Ida Valley 5000 5000 49 PW Act 10 1912 1917 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 4011 Works Formal 
Charges 5199 
of PW Act 81 
capital committee 
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TABLE A 3.1 General Scheme Data (Cant'd) 
Scilurne Name Irrigable Water No of Legislation Approved First 5upply End of Form of Notified Accumulated Operator Irrigator 
Area Availa- Irrigators Develop- Capital Interest Loss End 01 Organisation 
(ha) bility men! Liability Rate (%) 87/88 
Area Period ($0005) 
(hal 
Idaburn 228 228 6 PWAct 28 1931 1931 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 158 Works Formal 
Charges 5199 capital committee 
of PW Act 81 With HawkJun 
La st ChJnco 983 983 30 PWAct 10 1923 1923 n.a. Int on 114 4 1529 Works Formal 
Charges 5199 capital commlttoe 
of PW Act 81 
M,lnuherikia 1854 1854 158 PWAct 10 1923 1922 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 3168 Work5 Formal 
Charges 5199 capital committuo 
of PW Act 81 
Orn Jkau 5560 5560 67 PWAct 28 1962 1936 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 2792 Works Formal 
Charges 5199 capital committee 
of PW Act 81 
Pisa 1019 1019 17 PWAct 28 1955 1956 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 505 Works Formal 
Charges 5199 capital committee 
of PW Act 81 
r1ipponvale 366 366 35 PWAct 28 1955 1957 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 685 Works Formal 
Charges 5199 capital committeo 
of PW Act 81 
Tarras 1038 1038 12 . PWAct 10 1923 1925 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 1534 Works Formal 
Charges 5199 capital commltteu With 
of PW Act 81 Ardgour /Bug(J s 
Teviot 1386 1386 49 PW Act 10 1923 1924 n.a. Int on 1/4 4 1825 Works Formal 
Charges 5199 capital committee 
of PW Act 81 
33 
Table 5.1 Summary of Irrigation Costs 
Scheme Category Irrigable Area Historical Capital Standardised Capital Standardised Cost Standardised Losses 
of Operations 
(ha) Cost-Off Farm ($/ha) Cost-Off Farm ($/ha) Min Max Mean % Change 
($/ha) ($/ha) ($/ha) ($/h\\) 1 year 
Central Otago Schemes 
Anlgollr/Beggs Otago 527 165 4493 75.0 173.5 116.2 1202 -5 .9 
Am)w Otago 930 341 10840 89.4 '225.4 148.4 2194 -4.:1 
Rannockbum Otago 321 39 1290 3.1 50.3 18.8 3 -30.8 
Elmlsclcugh Otago 1159 309 6182 62.8 126.6 10\~4 903 -7.0 
Galloway/lda Valley Ok1g0 - Large 6064 122 3832 42.8 91.0 64.3 700 -8.4 
Hawkdun Otago - Large 3308 82 1783 82.1 249.3 114.8 1169 -4.6 
Idahllm Otago 228 87 2055 33.7 230.9 93.9 734 +4.6 
Last Chance Otago 983 253 4867 100.0 269.0 161.0 1647 -5.0 
Man IIhcrik ia Otago - Large 1884 367 9996 87.1 205.9 139.4 1781 -6 .5 
Omakau Otago - Large 5641 124 3864 43.5 80.9 57.2 524 -ID 
Pisa Otago 1019 196 3074 37.3 143.0 87.4 525 -10.8 
Ripponvale Ok1go - Hort 386 501 7878 156.1 349.5 233.4 1879 +7 .7 
Tarras Otago 1038 342 9854 62.6 187.0 119.0 1565 -(l.n 
Teviot Otago 1386 153 4164 81.5 236.2 131.9 1394 -6.8 
Mid Cantcrhury Schemesl 
Ashburton/Lyndhursl Canterbury - 24535 73 2474 13.1 24.1 16.9 10 -6.4 
Large 
Mayfie\d/Hinds Canterbury - 30978 91 3053 8.5 13.2 10.6 4Cr -592.8 
Large 
Rcdcliff Waitaki - Large 1825 44 1450 22.7 42.5 33.3 171 -8 .9 
Valctta Canterbury - 7385 71 1151 3.8 13.5 10.8 14 +98.3 
Large 
Noles 1 Levels costs are included with post-1960's schemes. Rangitata Diversion Race costs are omitted as they do not relate to irrigation. 
A2-4 (23/4/92) 
ss 5, 6 
Resource Management APPENDIX C 
AS.07 
AS.OS 
(c) Amenity values; and 
(d) The social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions which affect the 
matters stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this definition or which are affected 
by those matters:" 
" 'Amenity values' means those natural or physical qualities and characteristics of 
an area that contribute to people's appreciation of its pleasantness, aesthetic 
coherence, and cultural and recreational attributes:" 
Legislative intent 
It will of course be for the Planning Tribunal and the higher Courts to interpret 
and apply the section. But the following extracts from the speech of the Minister for 
the Environment Hansard (1991) p 3016, given when moving the third reading of the 
Bill, give some indication of the legislative content: 
"In adopting the present formulation of [section 5] the Government has moved 
to underscore the shift in focus from planning for activities to regulating their 
effects of which I have spoken. We run a much more liberal market economy 
these days. Economic and social outcomes are in the hands of citizens to a much 
greater extent than they have previously been. The Government's focus is now on 
externalities - the effects of those activities on the receiving environment - and 
those effects have too often been ignored. 
"[Section 5] enables people and communities to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural well-being. Significantly, it is not for those exercising 
powers under the Bill to promote, to control, or to direct. With respect to human 
activities it is a much more passive formulation. People are assumed to know best 
what it is that they are after in pursuing their well-being. Rather, those who 
exercise powers under the legislation are referred to a purpose clause that is about 
sustaining, safeguarding, avoiding, remedying, and mitigating the effects of 
activities on the environment. It is not a question of trading off those 
responsibilities against the pursuit of well-being. Well-being is mentioned because 
the Bill is, of course, about the effects of human agency on the environment. The 
Bill would be quite unnecessary if there was no human activity. The Bill provides 
us with a framework to establish objectives by a physical bottom line that must not 
be compromised. Provided that those objectives are met, what people get up to is 
their affair. As such, the Bill provides a more liberal regime for developers. On 
the other hand activities will have to be compatible with hard environmental 
standards, and society will set those standards. [Section 5] sets out the biophysical 
bottom line. 
"Unlike the current law, the Bill is not designed or intended to be a 
comprehensive social-planning statute. It has only one purpose - to promote the 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources, and it does that in two 
ways: first through the allocation of resources in public ownership such as the 
coast and geothermal energy; and, secondly, through limiting the adverse 
environmental effects of the use of natural and physical resources. For the most 
part, decision makers operating under the Bill's provisions will be controlling 
adverse effects, especially in relation to the use of private land. The Bill should be 
seen as legitimising intervention only to achieve its purpose. To limit the reasons 
for and focus of intervention is intended not only to achieve sustainability of 
natural resources, but also to facilitate matters for those who seek consents. 
"Benefits will flow from there being fewer but more targeted interventions. 
Better environmental quality will be achieved with fewer restrictions on the use 
and development of resources, but higher standards in relation to their use." 
Relationship with WSCA67 
For a discussion of the interpretation of "sustainable management" in subs (2) and 
the "balancing" test which applied under the WSCA67, see WR2.2. • 
6. Matters of national importance-In achieving the purpose of this Act, all 
persons exercising functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural and physical resources, shall recognise and 
provide for the following matters of national importance: 
Effects of Transaction Costs on Price and Quantity 
18. Elfp-cts of Transaction C{)st~ on Pricp- and Quantity 
In previous sections, we have assumed that no middlemen existed who 
facilitated the workings of the market by helping to match up buyers and 
sellers. In many real-life markets, such middlemen play an important 
role. Among other things, they often help to provide relevant informa-
tion to buyers and/or sellers, to execute \vhatever sales contracts are 
involved, and to help guarantee that the good is of the proper quality and 
that the buyer will pay the seller promptly and fully. For services of this 
sort. the middlemen receive a share of the price paid for the good. For 
example, in the New York Stock Exchange, a purchaser or seller of a 
stock must pay a commission to the broker handling the transaction. 
Also, there is a spread between the bid price (the price to a seller) and the 
ask price (the price to a buyer); that is, the former price is less than the 
latter price. This spread goes principally to the Exchange's specialist who 
continually stands ready to buy or sell this particular stock. To stay in 
business, the specialist must pay less, on the average, for a share of the 
stock than what he or she receives for it. 
The costs of these middlemen's services are often called transaction 
costs. What are the effects of these transaction costs on the equilibrium 
price and the equilibrium output of a good? For simplicity, assume that 
the transaction cost is proportional to the amount spent on the good. In 
particular, suppose that the transaction cost per unit of the good sold 
equals AB in Figure 8.20. That is, for every unit of the good that is sold, 
middlemen must be paid an amount equal to AB. Under these circum-
stances, there will be a gap between the price to the buyer and the price 
to the seller. In Figure 8.20, the equilibrium price will not be OP, as it 
would be if transaction costs were zero. Instead, the price to the buyer 
must exceed the price to the seller by AB, because this spread is required 
to pay the middlemen. Consequently, the price to the buyer must be OB 
and the price to the seller must be OA, because this is the only pair of 
prices differing by AB where the quantity supplied equals the quantity 
demanded. 
Clearly, the effect of a transaction cost of this type is to drive a 
wedge between the price to the seller and the price to the buyer-and the 
larger the transaction cost per unit of the good sold, the bigger the wedge 
driven between these prices. Further, the effect of the transaction cost is 
to reduce the quantity of the good that is bought or sold. Whereas the 
equilibrium quantity is OQ when the transaction cost is zero, it is OQ' 
when the transaction cost is AB per unit of the good sold. This demon-
strates an important point: As the transaction cost per unit of good sold 
increases, the amount of the good sold will tend to decrease. Eventually, 
if the transaction cost becomes big enough, the market for the good will 
cease to function at all; that is, the good will no longer be traded. This 
has happened to some commodities. For example, the market for used 
clothes has largely disappeared in the United States in recent years. 
Because the cost of selling used clothes is now so high relative to what 
people are willing to pay for them, there is no longer any profit to be 
made by trying to sell most types of used clothes; instead, they are 
thrown out or given away. 
228 Price and Output under Perfect Competition 
Supply 
A 
o~--------~--~----------____ ___ 
Figure 8.20 Effect of transaction costs on price and quantity 
APPENDIX D 
EMBARGOED UNTIL 3.30PM 
PRESS RELEASE RT HON GEOFFREY PALMEI 
AUGUST 4 1989 MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMEN~ 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENHANCED 
An exciting new era in environmental protection will get under way next 
year, with the establishment of an agency for environmental protection, 
Environment Minister Geoffrey Palmer announced today. 
The new agency would be set up as part of the resource management law 
reform. 
It would have important responsibilities in two major areas. It would d 
with major pollution issues and it would be responsible for assessing an 
controlling hazardous substances. 
"This move will give the environment a strong voice in the way we manage 
our resources," Mr Palmer said. 
"The present environmental protection system is fragmented and 
inconsistent. It is a maze. It doesn't make sense and, more importantl 
it doesn't work. 
"We are an industrialised society. Despite our relatively small size an 
clean, green image, some of our environmental problems are quite serious 
"We are going to set up a system that works for the community and for th, 
environment we all cherish. 
"Many groups have argued that a single streamlined and effective 
organisation is the best way to give the environment a voice." 
The n~ency would: 
* set national standards for pollution, waste management, hazardous 
substances and hazardous installations; 
* assess and identify substances that are hazardous to the environment 
and/or to human health; 
* develop workable controls designed to manage the importation, storage , 
use and disposal of hazardous substances; 
* develop a manifest-based tracking system for very hazardous substance~ 
* develop a workable system for monitoring pollution and hazardous 
substances; 
* develop a centralised data base, bringing together current informatic 
from diverse sources; 
* provide technical advice and ensure adequate training on major pollutj 
matters, and on hazardous substances issues. 
It would be formed by combining functions currently undertaken by the 
Pesticides Board, the Animal Remedies Board, the Radiation Protection 
Advisory Council and the Toxic Substances Board. 
The new agency would be set up in the Resource Management Act to be 
introduced into Parliament later this year. 
A further package of legislation dealing with specific powers and functj 
would be introduced next year, Mr Palmer said. 
-
The proposal for an agency for protection of the environment originated 
the November 1988 report of the Inter-Agency Co-ordinating Committee on 
Hazardous Substances. 
The need for an agency was highlighted in many submissions to the 
Government on Resource Management Law Reform. 
"Many~le - industry, environmentalists, farmers, individuals - spoke 
their concern that pollution of air, land and water is a growing problem 
New Zealand. 
"Many people endorsed the need for a new agency, and the Government has 
listened to that concern," he said. 
The Manukau Harbour was a graphic example of how the old administrative 
systems had served the environment poorly. The harbour had been severel~ 
damaged by toxic heavy metals, waste oil, chemicals and other pollutants . 
The situation was made worse by the total lack of any integrated control 
over pollution. 
The fact that pollution controls were currently operated by various 
authorities lay behind the problems authorities had experienced in tryinS 
to stop pollution in their areas, said Mr Palmer. Each agency or authorj 
usually dealt with only one form of pollution. There were too few links 
between authorities, and often no consistent national standards. 
"Establishing a new agency to protect the environment will put an end to 
fragmented and inconsistent pollution management. The agency will not or. 
ensure national standards are set and maintained. It will involve local 
government in implementing and enforcing standards," he said. 
The new organisation would be a central agency which would work closely 
with regional and territorial government, and with other central governme 
agencies. 
"It will operate in a way that enables public involvement in its 
decisions," said Mr Palmer. 
"It will also be required to be cost effective. To that end I have 
directed officials to investigate the links between the agency and the 
functions of the Department of Health, The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries and other agencies." 
The offi.::lals group was expected to report back to Government within six 
weeks. 
"In particular, officials have been asked to ensure that MAP continues t , 
have responsibility for seeing New Zealand meets export market access 
requirements for food products." 
Mr Palmer said the establishment of the agency would mean New Zealand COl 
look forward to a safer future in which pollution will be prevented, or j 
least be better controlled, and the risks posed by hazardous substances 
would be greatly reduced. 
"All this will result from having proper management systems in place, anc 
with the new agency established to act as watchdog." 
ENDS 
